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PREFACE 
The submission of this thesis fulfills the final 
requirements for graduation from the Honors College. This thesis 
represents the culmination of the honors program at Ball State 
University. 
The primary objective of the honors thesis that follows is 
to allow the serious accounting student and prospective 
candidates going into the profession to develop a better 
understanding of the controversial issues facing the accounting 
profession, the current and future adversarial environment in 
which they will be operating, and recommendations for minimizing 
their susceptibility to litigation through the detection and 
prevention of irregularities. This thesis places primary 
emphasis upon the independent auditors' expanding role for the 
detection and prevention of fraud. Supplementary material has 
been provided in the "Appendices" for further review and 
development. 
This thesis only provides the reader with a brief overview 
and analysis of the problems facing the accounting professional 
and is not meant to be comprehensive or all-inclusive. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the serious accounting student 
considering a career in public accounting do further research 
into the legal implications inherent within the profession itself 
before beginning their field of work. The purpose of the 
"discussion" that follows is only to make the reader cognizant, 
or aware, of the dilemma that has and will continue to challenge 
the accounting profession. 
I 
p 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Many have contributed to make the compilation of this 
project possible. I would like to thank the accounting 
professors, Ball State University, and the Honors College for the 
opportunity to work on this honors thesis. Special thanks to the 
following people for their assistance: 
My parents, Mr. & Mrs. Quang & Tri Tran, and family for 
their continual support, both mentally and physically, 
and their confidence in my abilities; 
Dr. Paul Parkison, Head of the Accounting Department 
and thesis advisor, for his advice and guidance 
throughout the project and for providing me with the 
inspiration to complete the project; 
Dr. James Schmutte, my "ACC 451 Auditing" professor, 
for his contribution to my overall base knowledge of 
the area of auditing in general; 
Mrs. Patricia Jeffers, secretary of the Honors College, 
for her efforts and dedication in maintaining an open 
line of communication and for the monitoring of, 
enrollment in, and completion of HONRS 499 "The Honors 
Thesis"; 
Dr. Arno Wittig, Dean of the Honors College, for his 
confidence and advice during the preliminary stages of 
the project; and, 
Brenda Melendez, my colleague in the accounting 
program, for her encouragement and assistance in the 
proofreading of the honors thesis. 
Their knowledge, advice, confidence, encouragement, and support 
have all contributed significantly to the completion of this last 
requirement. 
prepared by Trinh Tran 
April 1992 
r-r -wf-------'"-'--
INTRODUCTION 
The accounting profession is an extremely high-risk practice 
area vulnerable to the atrocities of litigation. In effect, 
today's practitioners must be increasingly alert to the inherent 
risk of accountant's liability and be able to effectively cope 
with the litigious environment in which they operate. The recent 
adversarial atmosphere induced by the Savings and Loan Industry 
and the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petitions of Laventhol & Horwath 
and Spicer & Oppenheim serve as painful reminders of the 
inevitability of the risk of accountant's liability. 
Unfortunately, the independent auditor has become the 
scapegoat for numerous business failures. In modern-day society, 
the independent auditor has the highest probability of incurring 
a lawsuit invoked by the creditors and investors of an insolvent 
business. This condition coincides with the "deep pocket" theory 
which focuses upon a party's ability to pay rather than who is 
actually responsible for the financial failure. "[B]ecause the 
independent auditor is still financially solvent and has good 
malpractice insurance, he or she is the 'fairest' of all fair 
game" (Broom and Brown 1991, 31). Nevertheless, deeply embedded 
beneath this predicament is a far more perplexing problem -- the 
inability of lawmakers, the legal system, the public, and the 
profession to reach a consensus as to the independent auditor's 
role in the detection and reporting of financial management fraud 
(Swanberg 1988, 7). 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a better 
understanding of the various aspects of fraud, its impact on the 
[ f' 
accounting profession, and measures for its detection and 
prevention. In accomplishing these objectives, it will be 
necessary to explore the controversy between the auditor's 
professional responsibility as understood by the profession 
relative to public opinion, the legal system, and other external 
forces in regards to the detection of fraud. 
THE AUDITOR'S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The "Expectation Gap" 
The real challenge confronting the accounting profession 
that serves as the primary impetus for the auditor's expanding 
role in the detection of fraud is the public's perception and 
expectations of the profession. According to Joseph E. Connor in 
his article "Close Accounting's Confidence Gap" published on 
December 3, 1985 in The Wall Street Journal, these expectations 
are divided into three categories: 1. While the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the courts, the profession, and 
members of Congress, initially, envisioned the auditor's primary 
responsibility as one of preventing the fraudulent reporting of 
financial statements, public opinion extended the scope of this 
role to include the detection and disclosure of fraudulent 
financial reporting; 2. Furthermore, the public expected the 
auditor to forewarn them of any "impending business failure," 
thus, explaining the frequent association of a business failure 
with an audit failure; and 3. Finally, public opinion also 
contended that "the profession's peer-review process [wouldj 
prevent substandard audit performance and mete out swift 
punishment if it occur[redj" (Berton and Schiff 1990, 54-5). 
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In essence, "[i]ndependent accountants facilitate the 
efficient operation of the nation's capital markets by developing 
public confidence in the credibility and reliability of corporate 
financial information" (Goldstein and Dixon 1989, 439). As a 
result, public confidence in the accounting profession coincides 
with its confidence in business, therefore, making them 
inseparable. Much to the dissatisfaction of the public, however, 
an audit is only designed to provide "reasonable assurance" as to 
the reliability of corporate financial statements through the 
application of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) to 
insure that the statements are "presented fairly in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)" (Goldstein 
and Dixon 1989, 441). 
During the mid-1970s and again in the mid-1980s, in reaction 
to public discontent and a precipitous "series of large-scale 
business failures and disclosures of egregious fraud", Congress 
engaged in critical scrutiny of the accounting profession, 
threatening to impose a legislative resolution to the problem 
(Goldstein and Dixon 1989, 440). In an attempt to deter the 
passage of "remedial legislation," the SEC and the accounting 
profession adopted more stringent professional standards for the 
detection and disclosure of fraudulent financial reporting and 
disciplinary action to enforce the standards. 
The adoption of SAS Nos. 16, 17, and 20 in 1977 by the 
AICPA's Auditing Standards Board ("ASB") was a direct result of 
an attempt by the profession to mitigate legislative 
p 
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intervention. While not making fraud detection the primary focus 
of an audit, SAS 16 (AU 327) required that the independent 
auditor, "'within the inherent limitations of the auditing 
process, ••• plan his examination ... to search for errors or 
irregularities that would have a material effect on the financial 
statement, and to exercise due skill and care in the conduct of 
that examination'" (Swanberg 1988, 7). If the auditor, during 
the process of the audit, had reason to believe that a fraudulent 
act had been committed, this concern had to be conveyed to 
management or other proper authorities in charge of the audit. 
This condition also had to be disclosed within the independent 
auditor's report. Nevertheless, the duties of the independent 
auditor fall short of providing absolute guarantees as to the 
audited financial statements being free of any material 
misstatements, including financial management fraud. In 
accordance with SAS 16, "'The auditor is not an insurer or 
guarantor; if his examination was made in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards, he has fulfilled his 
professional responsibility'" (Swanberg 1988, 7). 
Under the guidelines set forth by SAS 17 (AU 328), the audit 
examination could not "be expected to provide assurance that 
illegal acts [would] be detected •.• The determination of whether 
an act [was] illegal [was] usually beyond the auditor's 
professional competence" (Goldstein and Dixon 1989, 452). 
Nonetheless, the auditor was urged to be aware of the existence 
of illegal acts giving rise to material misstatements on the 
I F 
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financial reports. The auditor, however, was under no obligation 
to give notice of an illegal act to any party other than the 
client. 
The adoption of SAS 20 (AU 320) introduced guidelines for 
the consideration of the internal control structure in a 
financial statement audit. under this section, "any material 
weaknesses in the client's internal control system discovered in 
the course of an audit [was to] be communicated to senior 
management and the board of directors or the audit committee ••. 
[and] precluded reliance upon the system" (Goldstein and Dixon 
1989, 453-4). 
The SASs, aforementioned, Nos. 16, 17, and 20, however, have 
since then been superseded by SAS 53 (AU 316), SAS 54 (AU 317), 
and SAS 55 (AU 319), respectively. These new standards, released 
in July 1988, became effective as of January 1, 1989. Due to the 
nature and scope of this analysis, however, this paper will only 
make reference to SAS 53 (AU 316) on "The Auditor's 
Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities." 
Characteristics of Errors and Irregularities 
As defined in SAS 53 (AU 316), errors refer to the 
"unintentional misstatement or omission of amounts or disclosures 
in financial statements ••• [On the other hand,] irregularities 
refer to intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or 
disclosures in financial statements. Irregularities include 
fraudulent financial reporting undertaken to render financial 
statements misleading, sometimes called management fraud" (AICPA 
r 
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1991, 55). 
The materiality of the effect on financial statements and 
level of management or employees involved are two characteristics 
that may potentially influence the auditor's ability to detect 
errors or irregularities such as financial management fraud. 
"Section 312.13 states: 'The auditor generally plans the audit 
primarily to detect errors that he believes could be large 
enough, individually or in the aggregate, to be quantitatively 
material to the financial statements'" (AICPA 1991, 64). As a 
result, the independent auditor cannot give any assurance to the 
detection of immaterial errors or irregularities. In addition, 
irregularities perpetrated by senior management transcend, or 
override, the control procedures established to prevent or detect 
such irregularities. For this reason, auditing procedures and 
their effectiveness in the prevention and detection of material 
irregularities bear upon the integrity of management and the 
control environment. 
The extent and skillfulness of any concealment, relationship 
to established specific control procedures, and the specific 
financial statements affected also have the potential to affect 
the auditor's ability to prevent or detect irregularities. "The 
auditor's ability to detect a concealed irregularity depends on 
the skillfulness of the perpetrator, the frequency and extent of 
manipulation, and the relative size of individual amounts 
manipulated" (AICPA 1991, 65). Furthermore, the collusion, or 
cooperation between employees and/or management, to commit a 
r p 
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fraudulent act severely hinders the auditor's ability to detect 
the irregularity. Another factor that could impede the effective 
application of audit procedures in detecting irregularities is a 
lack of control procedures, a nonrecurring breakdown of a 
specific control procedure, or concealment through the 
circumventiop of specific control procedures. Finally, 
understatements and misstatements in the income statement are 
less likely to be detected than overstatements and misstatements 
concealed in the balance sheet. 
Auditor's Responsibility to Detect ••• 
As explicitly expressed in the guidelines set forth by 
SAS 53 (AU 316), the independent auditor's responsibility in 
regards to the detection of errors and irregularities is to 
develop an understanding of the characteristics of such errors 
and irregularities, aforementioned, and to design the audit to 
provide "reasonable assurance" of the detection of such material 
misstatements within the financial statements. The auditor is 
also held accountable for exercising due professional care in the 
planning, ŤẄŸȘẀWÙŪŦHĚ and analyzing of results derived from the 
audit process, which is to be undertaken with the proper degree 
of professional skepticism. Nonetheless, analogous with SAS 16 
(AU 327) and in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards, the auditor is still " •.• not an insurer and his 
report does not constitute a[n] [absolute] guarantee" that 
financial statements are free of material misstatement (AI CPA 
1991,56). 
r f 
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Risk Assessment 
During the planning stage of an audit, careful consideration 
should be given to the assessment of the risk of material 
misstatements. The auditor's risk assessment will most likely be 
influenced by the following factors: 1. the auditor's 
understanding of the internal control, 2. the size, complexity, 
and ownership characteristics of the entity, and 3. the risk of 
management misrepresentation. All of these factors and others 
should be taken into consideration when developing an overall 
audit strategy and determining the nature, timing, and extent of 
the audit procedures (AICPA 1991, 57-8). 
SAS 53 cautions the auditor to be cognizant of the 
risk factors in respect to management characteristics, 
operating and industry characteristics and engagement 
characteristics. Management characteristics include 
operating and financing decisions dominated by one 
single person; unduly aggressive management attitudes 
toward financial reporting; high management turnover, 
particularly among senior accounting employees; 
management placing undue emphasis on meeting earnings 
projections; and poor management reputation in the 
ŞẀVÙŪŤŸŸĚcommunity. If a management group contains 
some of these characteristics, the auditor must be 
quite skeptical in accepting and auditing such an 
engagement. 
SAS 53 identifies the following operating and 
industry characteristics which must be scrutinized in 
conjunction with an engagement: lower or inconsistent 
profitability relative to other firms; high sensitivity 
of operating results to economic factors such as 
inflation, interest rates, unemployment, etc.; rapid 
rate of change in industry; decentralized organization 
with inadequate monitoring; and internal or external 
factors that raise substantial doubt about the ability 
of the firm to continue as a going concern. The 
auditor must use skepticism with regard to these 
operating and industry characteristics as well (Doost 
1990, 39). 
The staffing, degree of supervision, the overall strategy 
r 
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and scope of the audit, and the degree of professional skepticism 
employed during the engagement are a direct result of the level 
of risk assessed. A higher risk will result in, all or in part, 
more experienced personnel engaged in the audit, more extensive 
supervision, an expansion of the procedures implemented, 
implementation of procedures closer to if not as of the balance 
sheet date, modification of the nature of the procedures to 
obtain more persuasive evidence, and a higher degree of 
professional skepticism (AICPA 1991, 58-9). 
Professional Skepticism 
Conducting an audit with an attitude of professional 
skepticism, or rather a questioning attitude, can be merely 
stated as the recognition "that conditions observed and 
evidential matter obtained, including information from prior 
audits, need to be objectively evaluated to determine whether the 
financial statements are free of material misstatement" (AICPA 
1991,59). 
The degree of professional skepticism applied during an 
audit engagement is significantly influenced by the auditor's 
consideration of factors which bear upon the integrity of 
management. Should the auditor have reason to doubt management's 
integrity, "the auditor would potentially need to question the 
genuineness of all records and documents obtained from the client 
and would require conclusive rather than persuasive evidence to 
corroborate all management representations" (AICPA 1991, 60). In 
addition, if there is doubt that bears upon management's 
r 
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integrity, management's selection and application of significant 
accounting policies, primarily those relating to "revenue 
recognition, asset valuation, and capitalization versus 
expensing" should be evaluated to consider whether or not they 
have been improperly applied (AICPA 1991, 60). 
Effect of Irregularities on the Audit Report 
In the event that it becomes conclusive that the financial 
statements have become materially misstated due to the existence 
of an irregularity, the auditor should request the revision of 
the financial statements; otherwise, he should "express a 
qualified or an adverse opinion on the financial statements, 
disclosing all substantive reasons for his opinion" (AICPA 1991, 
62). If a circumstance should arise in which the auditor is 
precluded from the application of essential procedures, or he is 
unable to discern whether or not potential irregularities may 
materially alter the financial statements, the standards 
prescribe that the auditor disclaim or qualify his opinion and 
communicate his findings to the proper authorities in charge of 
the audit such as the audit committee or board of directors 
(AICPA 1991, 62). 
In consideration of the situation at hand, the auditor may 
also be inclined to withdraw from the engagement. This action 
may be appropriate in the event that the "client refuses to 
accept the auditor's report as modified" for any of the reasons 
previously mentioned. Moreover, "if the auditor is precluded by 
the client from obtaining reasonably available evidential matter, 
f f 
withdrawal ordinarily would be appropriate" (AICPA 1991, 62). 
Should the auditor decide to withdraw from the engagement, the 
reasons for withdrawal should be communicated to the audit 
committee or board of directors. 
Communications Concerning Errors or Irregularities 
11 
The audit committee is presumed to be adequately informed of 
any irregularities unless they happen to be clearly 
inconsequential, or insignificant. The auditor should, however, 
report to the audit committee any irregularities involving senior 
management that he becomes cognizant of during the course of the 
audit. "Irregularities that are individually immaterial may be 
reported to the audit committee on an aggregate basis, and the 
auditor may reach an understanding with the audit committee on 
the nature and amount of reportable irregularities" .(AICPA 1991, 
62) • 
Unless certain circumstances in which "a duty to disclose 
outside the client" exists or an irregularity influences the 
opinion expressed on the report, the auditor would be precluded 
from disclosure of any irregularities to "parties other than the 
client's senior management and its audit committee or board of 
directors" as a consequence of an "ethical or legal obligation of 
confidentiality" to the client (AICPA 1991, 62). Due to the 
complexity of this situation, however, it may be in the auditor's 
best interest to consult an attorney prior to any discussion of 
any irregularities to an outside party. 
r t 
I 
I 
12 
Responsibilities in other Circumstances 
Depending upon the nature or requirements of the engagement, 
the auditor may find his responsibilities to detect errors and 
irregularities more extensive or rather restricted than the 
"typical" audit engagement. The acceptance of an engagement, 
such as one· with a governmental agency in which the auditor is 
required to abide by specific standards, may go beyond that 
prescribed by generally accepted auditing standards. "These 
standards require the auditor not only to promptly report 
instances of irregularities to the audited entity's management, 
but also to report the matter to the funding agency or other 
specified agency" (AICPA 1991, 63). Conversely, the auditor's 
responsibility such as the " •• assessment of risk .. and other 
aspects of the examination •. taken as a whole is necessarily more 
restricted" in the event that " •• an examination does not 
encompass a complete set of financial statements •• or when the 
scope is less extensive than an audit" (AICPA 1991, 63). 
Therefore, detection of material misstatements by the auditor is 
considerably reduced. 
AUDITOR'S LEGAL LIABILITY FOR FRAUD 
Definition of Fraud 
The auditor's exposure to liability for fraud may have 
significant social as well as economic consequences such as 
damaging effects on the firm's reputation. An essential element 
for proceeding any further in the investigation of fraud, what it 
constitutes, and measures for its prevention is to develop a 
I r 
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clear understanding of the type of misconduct which would be 
alleged as an act of fraud. 
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In legal terms, an act of fraud may be defined as conduct 
involving the misrepresentation of "a material fact" with 
knowledge or "inferable knowledge" of the falsity giving rise to 
economic injury which was "proximately caused" by "justifiable 
reliance" upon the false representation. various elements of 
this definition need to be clarified. Conduct involving a false 
representation may include engaging in affirmative action to 
prevent the discovery of the truth, omitting pertinent 
disclosures of material fact necessary in assessing the true 
financial position of the client, and assisting in the fraudulent 
act of a second party (Miller 1986, 85-6). "A material fact," in 
this case, constitutes any information that would significantly 
alter the outcome of the investor or creditor's decision. 
"Inferable knowledge" includes conduct involving gross 
negligence, a reckless disregard for the truth or, in this case, 
for one's professional responsibilities such as complying with 
generally accepted auditing standards. "Justifiable reliance" 
means that the reliance was foreseeable or warranted. 
"Proximately caused" means that "the economic injury was 
occasioned by •• reliance on [the] false representation" (Miller 
1986,86). 
Fraud: Common Law and statutory Law 
Two types of laws exist that enter into the determination of 
the liability for fraudulent conduct -- common law and statutory 
14 
law. Common law is essentially unrecorded law that has evolved 
through various court proceedings and judicial interpretations of 
what society constitutes as "fair" (Meigs 1989, 81). Statutory 
law is written law established through actions taken by state or 
federal legislative bodies. The federal securities laws, 
primarily Rule 10b-5 which facilitates the enforcement of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is the principal statutory 
source promulgating accountant's liability for fraud. The 
antifraud provision Rule 10b-5 is stated as follows: 
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices. 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails ... 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact 
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
(Miller 1986, 97-8). 
A significant court case pertaining to the application of 
Rule 10b-5 was decided by a Supreme Court ruling on March 30, 
1976, in the case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 
This decision seems to place important limitations on 
the scope of civil liability for damages under Rule 
10b-5. The plaintiffs in the Hochfelder case had 
invested in a securities scheme perpetrated by the 
president of a brokerage firm .•• The Supreme Court 
concluded that the words, "manipulative," "device," and 
"contrivance" in the statute [Rule lOb-51 clearly show 
that it was the Congressional intent to proscribe a 
type of conduct quite different from negligence, and 
the use of the word "manipulative" particularly 
" 
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"connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to 
deceive or defraud investors by controlling or 
artificially affecting the price of securities." As a 
result, the Supreme Court dismissed the action against 
Ernst and thereby indicated an approach toward limiting 
the previously expanding bounds of civil liability 
under the federal securities laws (Skousen 1991, 131). 
Actual vs. Constructive Fraud 
The act of fraud may be divided into two categories: actual 
fraud with an intent to deceive and constructive fraud with less 
than an actual intent to defraud. "Fraud is defined as [the) 
misrepresentation by a person of a material fact, known by that 
person to be untrue or made with reckless indifference as to 
whether the fact is true, with the intention of deceiving the 
other party and with the result that the other party is injured" 
(Meigs 1989, 80). In the latter case of constructive fraud, 
"[t)he conduct that lies between making a false representation 
solely because of a failure to exercise due care, and making a 
representation known to be false, consists of making a false 
representation (1) without belief in its truth or (2) with a 
reckless or grossly negligent disregard for its truth or falsity" 
(Miller 1986, 102). Refer to "Glossary" for definitions. 
An illustrative case involving constructive fraud is the 
landmark case of Ultramares v. Touche in 1931. In this court 
proceeding, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, during the 
course of their audit, failed to detect the fraudulent 
misrepresentation of the accounting records of Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc., involving the falsification of a material amount of 
"accounts receivable and other assets which turned out to be 
ĤĤĤĤĤĤŸĤĤŸĤĤĤĤŸĤĤĤĤĤŸĤ ------ ----
fictitious" (Miller 1986, 5). 
In the Ultramares Corp. v. Touche case described above, 
Judge Cardozo's various formulations of fraud include: 
(a) "The pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is 
none" ; 
(b) "[A]n opinion ••• may be found to be fraudulent if 
the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead 
to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief 
back of it; 
(c) A "reckless misstatement"; 
(d) "[I]nsincere profession of an opinion"; and 
(e) Closing one's eyes "to the obvious" and "blindly" 
giving assent. 
Of particular importance is Judge Cardozo's 
statement that negligence may be evidence from which a 
trier of fact may draw an inference of fraud. Judge 
Cardozo states that "negligence or blindness, even when 
not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to 
sustain an inference of fraud. At least this is so if 
the negligence is gross" (Miller 1986, 106). 
Nature of Liability 
Under the common law, the accountant's liability may be 
divided into two parts: (1) liability to the client and (2) 
16 
liability to third parties. Most of the litigation directed 
towards the accounting profession are induced by third parties, 
primarily investors and creditors, in an attempt to recoup their 
financial losses. 
The accountant's liability to the client consists of 
negligence in the exercise of due professional care and for a 
breach of confidentiality. In regards to negligence, the client 
must prove that his financial loss was a result of negligence on 
the part of the auditor rather than just an error in judgment. 
The auditor is placed in an awkward position, however, with 
respect to the confidentiality issue. "Since the accountant is 
considered to have a duty to the public, the recent rise in 
consumerism has imposed tighter limits on what is considered 
confidential information between the accountant and the client" 
(Skousen 1991, 126). 
"As the fiduciary duty to clients has been limited, 
17 
liability to third parties and the public has expanded" (Skousen 
1991, 126), as presented in the following section. 
THREE BASIC APPROACHES TAKEN BY THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
Unfortunately, there is no uniformity in the application of 
common law; what presides in one jurisdiction is not necessarily 
the case in another. Three basic approaches exist in determining 
the accountant's legal liability. These approaches, in order of 
increasing accountant's responsibility, consist of the Ultramares 
approach, the Restatement of Torts approach and the reasonably 
foreseeable user approach. 
Ultramares Approach 
The foremost legal case of accountant's liability, the legal 
precedent for ensuing cases was the landmark decision of 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (1931), which marked the turning point 
of the law of accountant's legal liability. Pursuant to this 
case, Ultramares, a factor, extended several loans to Fred Stern 
& Co. placing justifiable reliance upon the defendant CPAs' 
unqualified opinion on the company's balance sheet (Meigs 1989, 
85). The New York Court of Appeals held that the auditor or 
accountant was only held liable to third parties who were in 
privity of contract, or rather an identified third party 
beneficiary of the contract. Justice Cardozo was in support of 
this decision, which was more protective of the accounting 
profession, as reflected in the following "famous quotation": 
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless 
slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or 
forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may 
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class (Hanson 1991, 29). 
New York, Alabama, Colorado, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Indiana 
and Nebraska have all reaffirmed the validity of the Ultramares 
approach in recent court decisions, three of which were in 1989 
(HanSOn 1991, 29). 
Restatement of Torts Approach 
18 
The Second Restatement of the Law of Torts approach offers a 
"middle ground" position to accountant's liability. Under this 
approach, the legal system allows for the recovery of damages by 
a limited class of foreseen parties who justifiably relied upon 
the independent auditors' report. This approach exposes the 
accountant to higher potential liability than the application of 
the Ultramares rule. Pursuant to the application of the Second 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, "[iJf the accountant is aware 
that the audit results or financial statements will be forwarded 
to a particular third party, the accountant can be sued by the 
third party for negligence even though there is no privity of 
contract" (Hanson 1991, 29). Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Virginia 
and Washington have all adopted the Restatement approach in 
r , 
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determining accountant's legal liability in recent court 
proceedings. 
Reasonably Foreseeable User Approach 
Of all the approaches taken into consideration, the 
Reasonably Foreseeable User approach exposes the accountant to 
the greatest possibility of incurring liability. This approach 
takes the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts one step further 
to include all parties who are reasonably foreseeable recipients 
of financial statements for business purposes and who justifiably 
relied upon statements made by the accountant or auditor. The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey in the court case Rosenblum v. Adler 
of 1983, which adopted this Reasonably Foreseeable User approach 
in reaching its decision, is interpreted as follows: 
In this case, the defendant CPAs issued an unqualified 
report on the financial statements of Giant Stores 
Corporation, which showed the corporation to be 
profitable. In reliance upon these statements, 
Rosenblum sold a catalog showroom business to Giant in 
exchange for shares of Giant's stock. Shortly 
afterwards, Giant filed for bankruptcy and the stock 
became worthless. Rosenblum sued Giant's CPAs, 
alleging ordinary negligence. The case was dismissed 
by the trial court, on the premise that the CPAs were 
not liable to third parties for ordinary negligence. 
However, the state supreme court reversed the lower 
court, finding that CPAs can be held liable for 
ordinary negligence to any third party the auditors 
could "reasonably foresee" as recipients of the 
statements for routine business purposes (Meig 1989, 
85) • 
"This approach abandons the privity requirement altogether and 
has been adopted by courts in California, Wisconsin, Mississippi 
and New Jersey" (Hanson 1991, 30). The jurisdictions adopting 
this approach seem to feel that the accounting profession has a 
r T 
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duty to act as a "public watchdog" against corporate fraud. 
In effect, even though Judge Cardozo set the precedent for 
accountant's liability to exclude liability for mere negligence 
while establishing liability to third parties for fraud and gross 
negligence amounting to fraud, subsequent cases have extended the 
scope of liability to third parties. Accountants may now be held 
liable to third parties for fraud, for gross negligence giving 
rise to fraud, and for ordinary negligence when the accountant 
knows that the work is being done primarily for the benefit of 
specified third parties. Refer to "Glossary" for definitions. 
COMPUTER CRIME 
Computer Fraud 
An innovation which has made a significant impact on the 
accounting profession is the invention of the computer. The 
integration of computerization into the business enterprise to 
accommodate the efficient operations of financial institutions 
and innumerable businesses has increased the inherent risk of 
computer crime. Today, computer fraud alone accounts for losses 
amounting to over $6 billion dollars annually in the United 
States (Doost 1990, 36). 
Fraudulent acts perpetrated through the use of computers are 
an even greater challenge to the accounting profession. Cases of 
fraud have been discovered in all areas of an organization, 
ranging from petty cash to invoicing and accounts receivable to 
lapping on cash collections and inventory manipulation. The most 
notable case involving computer fraud was the Equity Funding Case 
r , 
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which resulted in an estimated direct loss of $200 million and an 
indirect loss of over $2 billion (Doost 1990, 37). This case 
involved the collusion of top management and key employees to 
defraud a considerable number of investors through a scheme 
involving the creation of false insurance policies that resulted 
in an increase in the value of its shares (Doost 1990, 37). 
"[L]ess than 25% of all white.,.collar crimes are ever 
reported, making it very difficult to study and analyze cases of 
fraud •• Many fraudulent acts, particularly computer crimes, have 
been discovered not through regular audits, but by someone 
reporting them and exposing the perpetrators" (Doost 1990, 36). 
In light of the proliferation of computer crime and inadequate 
documentation and data necessary to formulate preventive measures 
for the detection and prevention of computer fraud, Ernst & 
Whinney has developed a concept designated as "The Fraud Cube." 
Underlying this concept is the ideology that there are three-
dimensions encompassing computer crime -- relationship, expertise 
and motivation. In this regard, computer fraud may be 
perpetrated by agents in direct association with the client 
company as well as those with no direct contact with the daily 
operations of the business such as outsiders. Furthermore, a 
novice is able to penetrate and misappropriate assets or 
manipulate the files and transactions of a client company just as 
readily as an agent with a high level of expertise of the 
functions of the computer system (Doost 1990, 38). 
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Dealing with Computer Fraud 
Ernst & Whinney has devised a three-level line defense 
system for dealing with computer crime -- prevention, detection, 
and limitation -- which is briefly presented in the following 
passages. These guidelines require that the auditor be cognizant 
of the administrative, physical and technical aspects of the 
problem in each category. 
The prevention line of defense may be divided into 
administrative, physical and technical aspects. Security checks 
on personnel, proper segregation of duties and program 
authorization constitute a partial list of administrative control 
recommendations for the prevention of fraud. Physical controls 
entail locating computer facilities in inconspicuous locations 
and controlling access to the facilities. Finally, technical 
aspects consist of the encoding of data and the utilization of 
access control software and passwords, to restrict unauthorized 
access to terminals (Doost 1990, 38). 
Analogous with the prevention line, the detection line of 
defense may also be separated into administrative, physical and 
technical aspects of control. In reference to administrative 
controls, the implementation of access and execution logs will 
allow for the documentation of users by time and location so that 
fraudulent activities may be detected. Physical controls might 
include posting guards and limiting entrance into computer 
facilities through the use of entry logs, special entry keys and 
requiring identification badges to be presented. Finally, the 
r T , 
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application of transaction logs is one example of a technical 
aspect of fraud detection (Doost 1990, 38). 
The third line of defense against computer crime is 
limitation. The rotation of duties and transaction limits, pre-
printed limits on checks or purchase orders, and various checks 
that can put limitations on potential errors are examples of 
administrative, physical, and technical aspects of control, 
respectively (Doost 1990, 39). 
MINIMIZING THE RISK OF LITIGATION 
In order to minimize the adverse effects of the impending 
threat of litigation, the accountant is advised to: 
1. place greater emphasis upon compliance with the 
public accounting profession's generally accepted 
auditing standards and Code of Professional 
Conduct; 
2. retain legal counsel that is familiar with CPAs' 
legal liability; 
3. maintain adequate liability insurance coverage; 
4. implement a thorough investigation of prospective 
clients before accepting the engagement; 
5. obtain a thorough knowledge of the client's 
business; 
6. use engagement letters for all professional 
services; 
7. carefully assess the probability of errors and 
irregularities in the client's financial statements 
and exercise special care when the client has 
material weaknesses in internal control; and 
8. exercise extreme care in audits of clients in 
financial difficulties (Meigs 1989, 97-8). 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, due to the staggering number of lawsuits filed 
against auditors arising from cases involving bankruptcies and 
business failures, it is evident that confusion exists regarding 
the distinction between a business failure and an audit failure. 
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Most of the litigation directed towards the accounting profession 
are induced by third parties, primarily investors and creditors, 
in an attempt to recoup their financial losses. As supported by 
the current trend of the legal proceedings, the independent 
auditor, due to the thorough examination performed in the audit, 
is perceived as being in the most strategic position to detect 
any irregularities that could substantially misrepresent the 
financial position of a firm. Furthermore, it seems that 
"[bJecause it is likely that at least some of the litigation 
directed at auditors is based solely on the deep-pocket theory, 
the practicing accountant will never be able to entirely remove 
the risk of litigation from public practice" (Broom and Brown 
1991, 33). 
In an attempt to minimize the number of lawsuits. alleged 
against the independent auditor, the accounting profession has 
been and will continue to be forced to devise stricter auditing 
procedures that enhance the auditor's ability to detect fraud. 
The auditing standards currently being employed are not designed 
to detect fraud or provide absolute assurance to the detection of 
material misstatements. If the independent auditor is eventually 
required to devote greater emphasis on the detection of fraud, 
however, the exorbitant costs of future audits will be passed on 
to the client and will, more than likely, be absorbed by the 
general public. 
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GLOSSARY 
Breach of contract: 
failure of one or both parties to a contract to perform in 
accordance with the contract's provisions. A CPA firm might be 
sued for breach of contract, for example, if the firm failed to 
deliver its audit report to the client by the date specified in the 
engagement letter. Negligence on the part of the CPAs also 
constitutes breach of contract. 
COllDllon law: 
unwri tten law that has developed through court decisions; it 
represents judicial interpretation of a society's concept of 
fairness. For example, the right to sue a person for fraud is a 
common law right. 
Comparative negligence: 
a concept used by certain courts to allocate damages between 
negligent parties based on the degree to which each party is at 
fault. 
Constructive fraud: 
this differs from fraud as defined below in that constructive fraud 
does not involve a misrepresentation with intent to deceive. Gross 
negligence on the part of an auditor has been interpreted by the 
courts as constructive fraud. 
Contributory negligence: 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff that has contributed to his 
or her having incurred a loss. Contributory negligence may be used 
as a defense, because the court may limit or bar recovery by a 
plaintiff whose own negligence contributed to the loss. 
Engagement letter: 
the written contract summarizing the contractual relationships 
between auditor and client. The engagement letter typically 
specifies the scope of professional services to be rendered, 
expected completion dates, and the basis for determination of the 
CPA's fee. 
Errors: 
unintentional mistakes in financial 
records, including mistakes in the 
principles. 
Fraud: 
statements 
application 
and 
of 
accounting 
accounting 
the misrepresentation by a person of a material fact, known by that 
person to be untrue or made with reckless indifference as to 
whether the fact is true, with the intention of deceiving the other 
party and with the result that the other party is injured. 
.. 
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Gross negligence: 
the lack of even slight care, indicative of a reckless disregard 
for one's professional responsibilities. Substantial failures on 
the part of an auditor to comply with generally accepted auditing 
standards might be interpreted as gross negligence. 
Irregularities: 
intentional distortions in financial statements, often accompanied 
by falsifications in the accounting records. 
Negligence: 
a degree 
exercise 
to another 
violation of a legal duty to exercise 
ordinarily prudent person would 
circumstances, with resultant damages 
Ordinary negligence: 
of care 
under 
party. 
that an 
similar 
violation of a legal duty to exercise a degree of care that an 
ordinarily prudent person would ŤẄŤŲȘŸVŤĚ under similar 
circumstances with resultant damages to another party. For the 
CPA, ordinary negligence is failure to perform a duty in accordance 
with applicable professional standards. For practical purposes, 
ordinary negligence may be viewed as "failure to exercise due 
professional care." 
Plaintiff: 
the party claiming damages and bringing suit against the defendant. 
Precedent: 
a legal principle that evolves from a common-law court decision and 
then serves as a standard for future decisions in similar cases. 
privity: 
the relationship between parties to a contract. A CPA firm is in 
privity with the client it is serving, as well as with any third-
party beneficiary. 
Proximate cause: 
this exists when damage to another is directly attributable to a 
wrongdoer's act. The issue of proximate cause may be raised as a 
defense in litigation. Even though a CPA firm might have been 
negligent in rendering services, it will not be liable if its 
negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss. 
statutory law: 
law that has been adopted by a governmental unit, such as the 
federal government. CPAs must concern themselves particularly with 
the federal securities acts and state blue-sky laws. These laws 
regulate the issuance and trading of securities. 
Third-party beneficiary: 
a person -- not the promisor or promisee -- who is named in a 
q 
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contract or intended by the contracting parties to have definite 
rights and benefits under the contract. 
(Meigs 1989, 79-81) 
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purpose of the Appendices 
The purpose of the "Appendices" is to provide the reader 
with supplementary information to facilitate his or her 
understanding of precautionary measures taken by the profession 
underlying the detection and prevention of fraud. Exhibit 1, 
designated as "warning Signals of the possible Existence of 
Fraud," offers a detailed listing of possible warning signals 
that the independent auditor should be aware of and take into 
consideration in the planning and performing stages of the audit. 
Exhibit 2, entitled "Checklist of Possible Financial Fraud," and 
Exhibit 3 on "Warning Signals of Computer-Assisted Fraud" are 
provided as partial checklists that the auditor may use for the 
detection of financial and computer-assisted fraud in the course 
of the audit. Finally, Exhibits 4 and 5, entitled "Causes of 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting" and "The Treadway Commission's 
Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant," 
respectively, are taken from the Executive Summary of "The Report 
of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting." 
The purpose of these last two exhibits is to provide a brief 
summary of the causal factors leading to fraudulent financial 
reporting and recommendations made by the Treadway Commission in 
order to limit the frequency of such occurrences. 
4 
Exhibit 1 Warning Signals of the Possible Existence of Fraud· 
Highly domineering senior management and one or more of the following. or 
similar. conditions are present: 
• An ineffective board of directors and/or audit committee. 
• Indications of management override of significant internal accounting 
controls. 
• Compensation or significant stock options tied to reported performance or 
to a specific transaction over which senior management has actual or 
implied control. 
• Indications of personal financial difficulties of senior management. 
• Proxy contests involving control of the company or senior management's 
continuance, compensation or status. 
2 Deterioration of quality of earnings evidenced by: 
• Decline in the volume or quality of sales (e.g .. increased credit risk or 
sales at or below cost). 
• Significant changes in business practices. 
• Excessive interest by senior management in the earnings per share effect 
of accounting alternatives. 
3 Business conditions that may create unusual pressures: 
• I nadequate working capital. 
• Littlellexibility in debt restrictions such as working capital ratios and 
limitations on additional borrowings. 
• Rapid expansion of a produce or business line markedly in excess of 
industry averages. 
• A major investment of the company's resources in an industry noted for 
rapid change. such as a high technology industry. 
4 A complex corporate structure where the complexity does not appear to be 
warranted by the company's operations or size. 
S Widely dispersed business locations accompanied by highly decentralized 
management with inadequate responsibility reporting system. 
6 Understaffing which appears to require certain employees to work unusual 
hours. to forgo vacations. and/or to put in substantial overtime. 
7 High turnover rate in key financial positions such as treasurer or controller. 
8 Frequent change of auditors or legal counsel. 
9 Known material weaknesses in internal control which could practically be 
corrected but remain uncorrected. such as: 
• Access to computer equipment or electronic data entry devices is not 
adequately controlled. 
• Incompatible duties remain combined. 
10 Material transactions with related parties exist or there are transactions that 
may involve conllicts of interest. 
11 Premature announcements of operating results or future (positive) expecta-
tions. 
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Exhibit 1 (Continued) 
12 Analytical review procedures disclosing significant fluctuations which cannot 
be reasonably explained. for example: 
• Material account balances. 
• Financial or operational interrelationships. 
• Physical inventory variances. 
• Inventory turnover rates. 
I3 Large or unusual transactions. particularly at year-end. with material effect 
on earnmgs. 
14 Unusually large payments in relation to services provided in the ordinary 
course of business by lawyers. consultants. agents. and others (including 
employees). 
15 Difficulty in obtaining audit evidence with respect to: 
• Unusual or unexplained entries. 
• Incomplete or missing documentation and/or authorization. 
• Alterations in documentation or accounts. 
16 In the performance of an examination of financial statements unforeseen 
problems are encountered. for instance: 
• Client pressures to complete audit in an unusually short time or under 
difficult conditions. 
• Sudden delay situations. 
• Evasive or'unreasonable responses of management to audit inquiries. 
(Braiotta 1981, 151-2) 
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o . 0 High rates of employee turnover 
o 0 Serially numbered documents missing 
o 0 Non-serially numbered documents 
o 0 Excessive or unjustified cash transactions 
o D Excessive or unjustified exchange items 
o 0 Failure to reconcile checking accounts 
o 0 Excessive number of checking accounts 
o 0 Photocopies of invoices in the files 
o 0 Manager or employee who falls into debt 
o 0 Excessive number of checks bearing second endorsements 
o 0 Excessive or material changes in bad-debt write-ofts 
o 0 Inappropriate freight expenses 
o 0 Inappropriate ratio of inventory components 
o 0 Business dealings with no apparent economic purpose 
o 0 Assets sold but possession maintained 
o 0 Assets sold for less than fair market value 
o -0 Continuous rollover of loans to management or employees 
o 0 Questionable changes in financial ratios 
o 0 Questionable leave practices 
o 0 Large sales discounts 
o D. Physical control of assets and accounting records by same employee 
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o 0 Internal auditors have no expertise in computer usage 
.' :-DONo restrictions on who has access to computer 
2":'0 0 Computer has capability of generating negotiable instruments 
co-0 0 Employees not property screened before employment 
.; 0 0 Reports of computer not properly controlled 
,-:·0 0 Morale of employees low 
,,' ;0 0 Computer used to process loans, obtain credit rating and maintaJn all accounting records 
:." , 0 0 Malfunctions, errors and rejected transactions by the computer are not examined by managemen 
ŸŸŸĦŸĦHĚ(King and Feldman 1992, 33 & 35) •• --, 
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EXHIBIT 4 CAUSES OF FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 
Incentives: 
* Desire to obtain higher price from stock or debt offering, 
* Desire to meet the expectations of investors, 
* Desire to postpone dealing with financial difficulties, 
* Personal gain, additional compensation, promotion or escape 
from penalty for poor performance. 
Pressures: 
* Sudden decreases in revenue or market share, 
* Unrealistic budget pressures, 
* Financial pressure from bonus plans based on short-term 
economic performance. 
Opportunities: 
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* Absence of board of directors or audit committee that oversees 
process, 
* Weak or nonexistent internal accounting controls, 
* Unusual or complex transactions, 
* Accounting estimates requiring significant subject judgment by 
management, 
* Ineffective internal audit staffs. 
Exacerbating factor: Weak corporate ethical climate 
Perpetrators of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 
* Sales representatives, 
* Accountants, 
* Executives, and 
* Top management (CEO, president, CFO) in majority of cases 
studied. 
Effect Sought: Smooth earnings or overstate company assets. 
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EXHIBIT 4 (Cont'd) 
Allegations against Independent Public Accountants: 
* Failure to conduct audit in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (lack sufficient competent evidential 
matter) ; 
* Fail to recognize and respond to "red flags"; 
* Most allegations against nonnational firms or sole proprietors. 
Classification of Recommendations: 
* For Public Companies, 
* For Independent Public Accountants, 
* For the SEC and Others to Improve Regulatory & Legal 
Environment, and 
* For Education. 
(Sweeney 1989, 17 & 19) 
EXHIBIT 5 THE TREADWAY COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 
Recognizing Responsibility for Detecting Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting 
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Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise 
standards to restate the independent public accountant's 
responsibility for detection of fraudulent financial reporting, 
requiring the independent public accountant to: (1) take 
affirmative steps in each audit to assess the potential for such 
reporting and (2) design tests to provide reasonable assurance of 
detection. Revised standards should include guidance for 
assessing risks and pursuing detection when risks are identified. 
Improving Detection Capabilities 
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should establish 
standards to require independent public accountants to perform 
analytical review procedures in all audit engagements and should 
provide improved guidance on the appropriate use of these 
procedures. 
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public 
accountants to review quarterly financial data of public 
companies before release to the public. 
Improving Audit Quality 
Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section should 
strengthen its peer review program by increasing review of audit 
engagements involving public company clients new to a firm. For 
each office selected for peer review, the first audit of all such 
new clients should be reviewed. 
Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section requirement for 
a concurring, or second partner, review of the audit report 
should be revised as part of an ongoing process of review of this 
requirement. Standards for the concurring review should, among 
other things: (1) require concurring review partner involvement 
in the planning stage of the audit in addition to the final 
review stage, (2) specify qualifications of the concurring review 
partner to require prior experience with audits of SEC 
registrants and familiarity with the client's industry, and (3) 
require the concurring review partner to consider himself a peer 
of the engagement partner for purpose of the review. 
EXHIBIT 5 (Cont'd) 
Recommendation: Public accounting firms should recognize and 
control the organizational and individual pressures that 
potentially reduce audit quality. 
Communicating the Auditor's Role 
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Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the 
auditor's standard report to state that the audit provides 
reasonable but not absolute assurance that the audited financial 
statements are free from material misstatements as a result of 
fraud or error. 
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards board should revise the 
auditor's standard report to describe the extent of internal 
accounting control. The Auditing Standards Board also should 
provide explicit guidance to address the situation where, as a 
result of his knowledge of the company's internal accounting 
controls, the independent public accountant disagrees with 
management's assessments stated in the proposed management's 
report. 
Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board 
Recommendation: The AI CPA should reorganize the Auditing 
Standards Board to afford a full participatory role in the 
standard-setting process to knowledgeable persons who are 
affected by and interested in auditing standards but who either 
are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public practice. 
(Sweeney 1989, 20) 

